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ABSTRACT 
 
Naked Short Selling: Is it Information-Based Trading? (August 2012) 
Hu Liu, B.S., Peking University; 
M.S., Research Institute of Petroleum Exploration and Development; 
Ph.D., University of Houston 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Edward P. Swanson 
 
 Naked short selling occurs when a short seller fails to deliver shares on the 
settlement day. The business press and many corporate managers characterize it as 
abusive price manipulation, alleging that selling nonexistent shares causes a price 
decline regardless of fundamentals. To curtail the practice, the SEC issued regulations, 
first to restrain and later to prohibit all naked short selling (i.e., Reg. SHO in 2004 and its 
amendment in 2009). Contrary to allegations, I find that the naked short selling 
component of total short interest is significantly associated with accounting and market 
fundamentals, indicating proper information usage. Further, naked short interest is 
highly significant in predicting one-quarter ahead abnormal stock returns, and it 
dominates covered short interest when both measures are included. I also calculate 
returns from a zero-investment trading strategy that buys (sells) shares with low (high) 
levels of both covered and naked short interest. I find abnormal returns are 
approximately 3.9 times larger than when using only covered short interest. Empirical 
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evidence therefore indicates that recent actions by regulators to eliminate naked short 
selling are likely to impede arbitrage and thereby reduce market efficiency. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defines “naked short selling” as 
selling short without borrowing the securities to make delivery (SEC 2004). Naked short 
selling differs from “covered short selling” in which shares are borrowed and delivered 
to the buyer on the settlement date, which is three days after the trade date. Putniņš 
(2010) reports that between 1.5% and 5% of average trading volume on the main U.S. 
exchanges between 2004 and 2009 involved failures-to-deliver.1  An intriguing aspect of 
naked short selling is that the shares traded do not exist (Christian et al. 2006). Selling 
“phantom” (paper) shares artificially increases the supply of shares in circulation, 
allegedly causing a decline in share price (Drummond 2006; SEC 2009). Critics argue 
that naked short selling is abusive and even illegal (Wherry 2003), and at least one 
organization, National Coalition Against Naked Shorting, has been organized to 
campaign against naked short selling. During the recent financial crises, the SEC 
expressed concern that naked short selling was associated with “sudden and 
unexplained” declines in stock prices that create questions about the underlying financial 
fundamentals of a given company as well as a crisis of investor confidence in the 
company without a “fundamental underlying basis” (SEC 2009). These concerns caused  
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of The Accounting Review. 
1 A failure to deliver (FTD) is not always intentional and can arise from various processing errors, delays 
in obtaining physical stock certificates or human error in entering an incorrect stock symbol (Putnins 
2010). As a result, the SEC requires that the aggregate FTD for a given security must reach at least 10,000 
shares before it is considered a threshold security. Consistent with prior research, we treat the total FTD as 
a proxy for abusive naked short selling. 
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the SEC (2009) to strengthen the “close-out” requirement of Reg. SHO in an attempt to 
eliminate naked short selling and to pass the Rule 10b-21, the “Naked” Short Selling 
Antifraud Rule, to increase the legal liability of naked short sellers (SEC 2008b).  
In this study, I investigate the assumption by the media and SEC that naked short 
selling reduces share price without regard to firm fundamentals. Even though naked 
short selling clearly increases the number of shares in circulation, this does not mean that 
naked short selling is not based on fundamentals. The same can be said for covered short 
selling because shares are generally borrowed from index funds, or other investors, who 
do not actively trade those shares. And academic research on short selling provides 
reason to question the allegation that naked short selling is not based on fundamentals. 
First, theory argues that short sellers contribute to efficient price discovery by more fully 
impounding into stock prices the impact of pessimists (Miller 1977; Diamond and 
Verrecchia 1987; Lee 2001). Second, empirical research shows that short sellers (on 
average) are sophisticated traders who establish positions consistent with the predictive 
value of market and accounting fundamentals (Dechow et al. 2001, Drake et al. 2011). 
Motivated by the inconsistency between SEC efforts to eliminate all naked short selling 
and academic research showing that total short selling improves price discovery, I 
investigate whether naked short selling is significantly associated with accounting and 
market fundamentals. If naked short selling is trading without “a fundamental underlying 
basis,” naked short interest, a proxy for naked short selling, should not be associated 
with accounting and market fundamentals in a manner consistent with proper usage of 
this information.  
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To-date, researchers have not separately studied the association between the 
naked component of total short interest and fundamentals. Naked short interest 
constitutes a small portion of total short interest, so prior research has effectively studied 
the covered component. At the outset, it is not clear that the finding in prior research that 
total short interest properly reflects accounting and market fundamentals should not be 
extended to the naked component without testing. First, corporate managers and 
regulators argue that naked short selling is often used by shorts to manipulate stock 
prices and is not based on fundamentals (as discussed in the opening paragraph).2 
Second, naked short sellers may not be able to hold their positions long enough for 
information about fundamentals to be incorporated into share prices. The broker may 
close out a naked position by buying shares in the open market-- without seeking 
consent from the trader -- at, or shortly after, the settlement date to comply with SEC 
regulations. In addition, a broker may buy without client consent after the settlement 
date if a short squeeze occurs, and a stock with a high level of naked short interest is 
more vulnerable to a squeeze (Jickling 2005).3 Third, short sellers have to be highly 
informed to offset high arbitrage costs, but naked short sellers receive an involuntary 
zero-fee, zero-rebate equity loan from the buyer (Putniņš 2010). Lower trading costs  
                                                 
2 Managers and regulators have institutional knowledge that should not be ignored. They do not provide 
any evidence, however, beyond the fact that naked short selling can create a rapid (and theoretically 
unlimited) increase in shares for sale. Covered short selling is slowed by the need to locate shares before 
selling. 
3 A short squeeze occurs when buy orders from other investors push up share prices rapidly, forcing short 
sellers to put up additional collateral or cover their positions by buying stock (which would further 
increase prices). Regulation SHO (2004) requires that stocks with large “fail-to-deliver” positions (at least 
10,000 shares) be included in a list that is published daily. Stocks on this “threshold list” are vulnerable to 
a short squeeze, as discussed by SEC specialist Jickling (2005). Foust (2005) describes instances where 
traders have reportedly made large purchases of stocks on the list. 
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mean that naked shorts can profit with a smaller information advantage than covered 
shorts. Fourth, naked short interest includes selling by market makers who take the 
opposite side of a customer’s share purchase to allow a transaction in a thinly traded 
stock. The market maker is trading to provide liquidity – not because fundamentals 
suggest overvaluation. In fact, the purchaser may have information the stock is 
undervalued. For these reasons, the role of accounting and market fundamentals in naked 
short selling is ultimately an empirical question. To my knowledge, this study is the first 
to provide such evidence.  
I use fail-to-deliver data, collected by the stock exchanges and provided by the 
SEC via the Freedom of Information Act, to decompose total short interest into naked 
and covered components. This is done by aligning naked and total short interest on the 
same trading date, and calculating covered short interest by subtracting naked short 
interest from total short interest. I then regress naked short interest on independent 
variables that capture accounting and market fundamentals, including the value score of 
Piotroski (2000),4 capital expenditures, and sales growth.  
I find that naked short interest is significantly and negatively associated with 
Piotroski’s value score, which suggests that naked short positions are lower for firms 
with accounting fundamentals that are sound and improving. I find that naked short 
interest is positively and significantly associated with both capital expenditures and sales 
growth. Prior research shows that high capital expenditures and high sales growth tend 
                                                 
4 I rename the F-Score from Piotroski (2000) as value score to avoid confusion with the “fraud-score” 
from Dechow et al. (2011). A stock with a high value score indicates improving fundamentals. The value 
score has been shown to be useful in predicting future abnormal returns (Piotroski 2000; Piotroski and So, 
2012). In an untabulated test, I find that the value score is predictive for my sample of firms. 
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to precede lower future returns. Naked short selling is also greater for smaller 
companies. Finally, naked short selling is lower for stocks where the consensus analyst 
forecast of earnings has increased over the past six months. Consistent with SEC 
concerns that naked short sellers trade solely on momentum, I find that naked short 
interest is negatively associated with stock momentum which suggests that naked short 
sellers are more likely to take positions in firms with negative stock price momentum. 
However, in supplemental analysis, I find evidence that suggests that naked short selling 
is based more on fundamental analysis than on stock momentum, a result which is 
contrary to the SEC concerns. In sum, naked short interest is significantly associated 
with accounting and market fundamentals in the direction showing proper usage of the 
information.  
To provide a comparison to the use of accounting information in covered short 
selling, I regress covered short interest on the same set of explanatory variables. I find 
the use of financial statement information is consistent with naked short selling. Most 
importantly, I find the coefficient on the value score is negative and statistically 
significant; and the coefficients on capital expenditures and sales growth are both 
positive and statistically significant. In sum, empirical evidence directly refutes the claim 
that naked short selling lacks a fundamental underlying basis.5 
To provide an alternative test of whether naked short selling captures predictive 
information, I regress one-quarter-ahead abnormal returns on naked and covered short 
                                                 
5 In the results section, I discuss the differences between naked and covered short selling. They do not 
arise from use of financial statement information and generally reflect the shorter investment horizon for 
naked short selling. 
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interest. I find that naked and covered short interest are each statistically significant with 
a negative association with future abnormal returns when included in separate models. 
However, when I include both measures in the same model, naked short interest remains 
significant, while covered short interest becomes insignificant. These results show that 
naked short interest not only has incremental predictive power over covered short 
interest, but it dominates covered short interest when both measures are used to predict 
future abnormal returns. The shorter investment horizon of naked short sellers could 
mean their positions are more likely to reflect recent information than are the positions 
held by covered shorts. Next, if naked short selling destroys firm value as alleged by 
critics, the current price would be too low and future returns should be positive as the 
market price corrects. Instead, the negative association between naked short interest and 
one-quarter ahead abnormal returns questions the claim that high naked short selling 
destroys firm value. 
Prior literature suggests that investors can earn economically significant positive 
abnormal returns using a zero-investment trading strategy that mimics short sellers. One 
profitable strategy is to buy (short sell) companies with low (high) levels of total short 
interest. Boehmer et al. (2010) shows that significant returns can be earned trading 
companies falling in the top and bottom one (five) percent. I propose an alternative 
trading strategy that uses the distinction between covered and naked short selling. My 
primary motivation is to determine if the statistically significant relation between naked 
short interest and one-quarter-ahead returns in a regression model is economically 
important. I first sort companies into quintile levels by the level of covered short interest. 
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Within each quintile, I sort again into quintiles based on levels of naked short interest 
(i.e., nested sorting). I then investigate a strategy that buys firms in the lowest quintile of 
both covered and naked short interest and sells short firms in the highest quintile of both 
covered and naked short interest. The strategy earns an abnormal return of 3.76 percent 
over the next quarter, which greatly exceeds a return of less than one percent from using 
only the covered component of short interest. The substantial improvement in returns 
supports the finding that naked short selling captures important predictive information. 
This result is reinforced by the abnormal returns earned by a similar trading strategy that 
is based on reversed sorting sequence. 
This study contributes to contemporary finance and accounting literatures in 
several ways. First, prior literature suggests that total short interest is significantly 
associated with market and accounting fundamentals in the direction consistent with 
proper usage of fundamentals to predict future returns (Drake et al. 2011). This study 
extends this finding to the naked and covered components of total short interest. We also 
show that the finding is robust to alternative measures of fundamentals. Second, we 
show that naked short selling provides information useful in predicting future returns. 
Separating total short interest into naked and covered components can increase profits 
from a zero-investment trading strategy that mimics trading by short sellers. Finally, the 
results in this study should be of considerable interest to regulators. While I do not 
attempt to refute the claim that naked short selling can be manipulative in some 
instances, I find consistent evidence across a wide range of tests showing that, on 
average, naked short selling is information based trading. This evidence is in stark 
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contrast to the SEC’s stated assumptions about naked short selling and allows me to 
conclude that eliminating naked short selling is likely to impede arbitrage and thereby 
reduce market efficiency. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews naked and covered 
short selling, including regulations and relevant academic literature. Section 3 describes 
research methods. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics and the results of univariate 
tests. Section 5 presents multivariate results. Section 6 presents conclusions, including 
policy recommendations.  
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2. BACKGROUND, REGULATIONS, AND RELATED LITERATURE 
 
2.1  Naked Short Selling and Related Regulations 
Short selling is an investment method where an investor attempts to profit from 
stock price decreases. Short selling consists of covered and naked short selling. In a 
covered short sale, the short seller “locates” the security to be sold, borrows shares in the 
given security, sells those shares on day t, and delivers the shares to the buyer on the 
settlement day (day t+3). The seller then closes (or covers) her position by purchasing 
shares in the identical security later on the open market at a lower price, returning the 
shares to the lender, and realizing a profit. In contrast, the shares traded in a naked short 
sale do not exist (Christian et al. 2006). In a naked short sale, the seller does not borrow 
shares of a given security in time to deliver the shares to the buyer within the standard 
three-day settlement period. Consequently, a naked short seller fails-to-deliver (FTD) the 
shares of the given security to the buyer at the settlement date (SEC 2009).  
Popular media and corporate managers claim that naked short selling ignores 
firms’ financial fundamentals and destroys firm value. A Forbes article, for example, 
claims that naked short selling caused a thousand companies to lose at least $100 billion 
in the stock market (Wherry 2003). Patrick Byrne, CEO of Overstock.com, stated that 
“Naked short selling consists of persons selling (or colluding with others to sell) massive 
quantities of stock they neither own nor have arranged to borrow…with the intent to 
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manipulate downward the stock price of targeted companies …, making tens (or 
hundreds) of millions of dollars engaging in this illegal conduct.”6  
Recently, the SEC also expressed significant concerns about the implications of 
naked short selling. Consistent with media speculation, the SEC concerns focused on the 
premise that naked short sellers trade primarily on momentum and not based on the 
financial fundamentals of a given company. Specifically, the SEC expressed concern 
that naked short selling was associated with “sudden and unexplained” declines in stock 
prices that create questions about the underlying financial fundamentals of a given 
company as well as a crisis of investor confidence in the company without a 
“fundamental underlying basis” (SEC 2009). Furthermore, the SEC noted that naked 
short selling has additional negative effects on shareholders because it potentially 
deprives them of the benefits of ownership such as voting and lending (SEC 2008b). 
In response to concerns that naked short sales lack a fundamental basis, the SEC 
developed a series of regulations first to restrain, and later to prohibit, all naked short 
selling. In 2004, the SEC enacted Regulation SHO (Reg. SHO) with the intention, at 
least in part, of reducing short selling abuses (SEC 2004). Reg. SHO established clear 
“locate” and close-out” requirements designed to reduce abusive trading by naked short 
sellers. The locate requirement of Reg. SHO allows brokers and dealers to execute a 
short sale order on an equity security only if the broker and dealer documents that the 
short seller can borrow the security in question and verifies that the short seller is able to  
                                                 
6 Please see http://www.overstock.com/naked-short-selling.html for more of Patrick Byrne’s comments on 
naked short selling. 
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deliver the security by the settlement date (i.e., within three days) (SEC 2004). The 
close-out requirement of Reg. SHO rule requires that brokers and dealers to "close-out" 
(i.e., purchase securities of like kind and quantity) FTDs that persist for ten consecutive 
settlement days in threshold securities (SEC 2004).7 
During the 2008 financial crisis, the SEC amended Reg. SHO in an effort to 
further restrict naked short selling. SEC Rule 204 of Reg. SHO was a temporary rule 
issued in October, 2008 (known at the time as Rule 204T) and made permanent in 2009 
(SEC 2008a, 2009). Rule 204 amends the close out requirement of Reg. SHO and 
requires brokers and dealers to close FTDs on the day after the three-day settlement 
period ends. As a result, the close-out period is reduced from ten days to one day, 
making it extremely difficult to intentionally become involved in a naked short sale. In 
addition, the SEC issued Rule 10b-21, the “Naked” Short Selling Antifraud Rule, in 
2008 which makes it illegal for short sellers to deceive brokers and dealers about their 
intention and ability to deliver securities by the settlement date and then fail to deliver 
the given securities (SEC 2008b).  
In combination, SEC regulations create a significant disincentive for naked short 
sellers to participate in the equity markets. Figure 1 presents evidence of the effect of the 
2008 SEC regulations issued in 2008. From 2004 to October, 2008 (when Rules 204 and 
10b-21 became effective), naked short interest represented, on average, approximately  
                                                 
7 A threshold security is a security for which there is an aggregate FTD position for five consecutive 
settlement days at a registered clearing agency that is greater than or equal to 10,000 shares and is at least 
0.5 percent of the issue’s total shares outstanding (SEC 2004). Self-regulated organizations (e.g., NYSE or 
NASDAQ) are required to compile and distribute a list of threshold securities (SEC 2004). 
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two percent of total shares outstanding. However, after Rules 204 and 10b-21 became 
effective, naked short interest, on average, dropped well below two percent of total 
shares outstanding. Thus, the monthly analysis in Figure 1 suggests that the SEC has 
effectively limited naked short selling. 
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FIGURE 1 
Naked Short Interest Over Time 
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2.2 Prior Research on Short Selling 
Although the media and the SEC operate under the assumption that naked short 
sellers trade primarily on momentum and not accounting fundamentals, there is little 
academic evidence to support such an assumption. While prior research does not provide 
direct evidence on the information used by naked short sellers, it does provide both 
theoretical and empirical evidence on the benefits of total short selling (i.e., both covered 
and naked short selling) as well as some evidence on the benefits of naked short selling. 
From a theoretical perspective, Miller (1977) argues that constraining total short selling 
creates a speculative premium as more optimistic agents push stock prices upward. In 
addition, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) predict that constraining total short selling 
will reduce the speed of prices adjustments to private information, especially bad news. 
Consistent with theoretical predictions, empirical evidence from the short selling 
literature suggests that short selling facilitates the price discovery process by moving 
stock prices toward firm fundamentals (Danielsen and Sorescu 2001; Jones and Lamont 
2002; Lamont and Thaler 2003; Cohen et al. 2007). For example, Boehmer et al. (2008) 
find that stocks with high levels of short interest underperform stocks with low levels of 
short interest in the month after a new short position is taken, which suggests that short 
sellers are able to anticipate declines in stock prices.  
Recent research that investigates the activities of naked short sellers also casts 
doubt on the validity of the SEC’s assumption that naked short selling is based on 
momentum and not firm fundamentals. Specifically, recent research finds that naked 
short selling does not trigger stock price declines (Fotak et al. 2009; Stone 2010; Boulton 
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and Braga-Alves 2011). In fact, Stone (2010) finds that stocks subject to naked short 
selling outperform other stocks on the day of the trade. In addition, Fotak et al. (2009) 
examine financial institutions during the 2008 financial crisis and find evidence that 
suggests that naked short sellers react to publicly available information such as credit 
rating downgrades. In addition, the authors find evidence that is consistent with naked 
short selling reducing positive pricing errors, return volatility, and bid-ask spreads 
(Fotak et al. 2009). In combination, prior research suggests that total short selling, and 
specifically naked short selling, likely benefits the price discovery process. 
 
2.3 Do Naked Short Sellers Trade on Accounting Information? 
Although recent research suggests that naked short sellers play a key role in price 
discovery, prior research has not investigated whether naked short sellers trade on 
primarily on momentum and not on accounting fundamentals as suggested by the media 
and the SEC. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether naked short sellers trade 
based on accounting fundamentals. To the extent that I find that accounting 
fundamentals are associated with naked short selling, it would suggest that the SEC 
regulations that prohibit naked short selling are likely to reduce market efficiency. 
Short sellers likely have significant incentives to incorporate all available 
information into trading decision because they face higher risk, regulation constraints, 
and greater trading cost compared with long traders, such as borrowing cost and holding 
cost. Consistent with this notion, Dechow et al. (2001) argue that a typical short seller 
takes a position based on fundamental analysis of firms. Drake et al. (2011) find that 
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total short interest is significantly associated with 11 future stock return indicators 
identified including accounting information such as total accruals, capital expenditures, 
and sales growth, which suggests that total short sales (i.e., both covered and naked short 
sales) are based on accounting fundamentals and are not purely driven by momentum 
based trading. 
At the outset, it is not clear whether Drake et al.’s (2011) finding that total short 
selling is associated with fundamentals will translate to naked short sales. As discussed 
in detail above, naked short sales are fundamentally different than covered short sales 
because naked short sellers trade on “phantom” shares (Christian et al. 2006). 
Specifically, naked short selling differs from covered short selling on several 
dimensions. First, corporate managers and regulators argue that naked short selling is 
often used by shorts to manipulate stock prices and is not based on fundamentals. The 
SEC felt this assumption was accurate enough to use it as the basis for Rules 10b-21 and 
204 (SEC 2008a; 2008b; 2009). Second, naked short sellers may not be able to hold their 
positions long enough for information about fundamentals to be incorporated into share 
prices. The broker may close out a naked position by buying shares in the open market-- 
without seeking consent from the trader -- at, or shortly after, the settlement date to 
comply with SEC regulations. In addition, a broker may buy without client consent after 
the settlement date if a short squeeze occurs, and a stock with a high level of naked short 
interest is more vulnerable to a squeeze (Jickling 2005). Third, short sellers have to be 
highly informed to offset high arbitrage costs, but naked short sellers receive an 
involuntary zero-fee, zero-rebate equity loan from the buyer (Putniņš 2010). Lower 
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trading costs mean that naked shorts can profit with a smaller information advantage 
than covered shorts. Fourth, naked short interest includes selling by market makers who 
take the opposite side of a customer’s share purchase to allow a transaction in a thinly 
traded stock. The market maker is trading to provide liquidity – not because 
fundamentals suggest overvaluation. In fact, the purchaser may have information the 
stock is undervalued. In combination, the above arguments suggest that naked short 
sellers potentially trade solely on price momentum and ignore the underlying 
fundamentals of a firm.  
 
  
  
18 
18 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
To investigate whether naked short selling is based on accounting fundamentals, 
I examine the association between the level of naked short interest and several 
accounting and market-based fundamentals. Because the purpose of short selling is to 
earn profit from future negative abnormal stock returns, I focus on accounting indicators 
that prior research suggests are able to predict future stock returns. I extend the short 
interest model used by Drake et al. (2011) to include Piotroski’s (2000) value score as 
well as several other variables to investigate whether naked short interest is associated 
with accounting indicators. The model is as follows:  
NakedShorti,t = 1 + 1VScorei,t-1 2Capexi,t-1 + 3SaleGrowi,t-1 + 4DivYldi,t-1  
+ 5FREVi,t + 6Momentumi,t + 7Sizei,t-1 + mIndustrym  
+ nYear-Qtrn + i,t       (1) 
The dependent variable, NakedShort is the average daily naked short interest 
during the current quarter. To ensure that investors have time to form trades based on 
recently available accounting information from the financial statements, I measure 
NakedShort over the period that begins five trading days after the firm files its quarterly 
financial statements for quarter t-1 (i.e., the 10-Q) and ends on the last day of quarter t. 
Following prior naked short selling studies (Fotak et al. 2009; Devos et al. 2010), I use 
naked short interest to proxy for naked short selling, and define naked short interest as 
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the number of FTD shares on day t divided by two8 and deflated by common shares 
outstanding (SHROUT) on day t. Because a naked short selling transaction is not 
disclosed by the SEC until day t+7, I lead the FTD seven days to its original trading date 
and align it with the trading date of total short interest reported by Compustat. Total 
short interest ratio equals short interest (SHORTINT) deflated by common shares 
outstanding.9 To provide a more complete examination of information usage by short 
sellers, I also examine the association between covered short interest and accounting and 
market fundamentals. Covered short interest (CoveredShort) is defined as the difference 
between total short interest ratio and naked short interest ratio. I divided both 
NakedShort and CoveredShort by their respective standard deviations (StdNakedShort 
and StdCoveredShort) because the mean of NakedShort (CoveredShort) is above (just 
below) the 75th percentile, which suggests that both NakedShort and CoveredShort are 
highly skewed.10 
To examine whether naked short sellers trade based on accounting fundamentals, 
I include several separate fundamentals that are commonly used in financial statement 
analysis. My first fundamental measure is Piotroski’s (2000) F-score, which is the sum 
of nine indicator variables and is designed to be a composite measure of firms’ financial 
strength. I rename F-Score to VScore (Value Score)11 to differentiate it from the Fraud- 
                                                 
8 I lead FTD data by seven business days because the threshold list does not provide the amount of fail-to-
delivers until the evening of t+7. I divide FTD by two because exchanges count every FTD twice (Fotak et 
al. 2010; Devos et al. 2010). 
9 Unless otherwise noted, all data items are from Compustat and measured on a quarterly basis. 
10 Inferences remain the same when I estimate Equation (1) using NakedShort and CoveredShort. 
11 The value score is divided by 100 to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficient. 
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Score used in Dechow et al. (2011). VScore is based on nine accounting fundamentals 
designed to capture three areas of a firm’s financial strength: profitability, financial 
leverage/liquidity, and operating efficiency (Piotroski 2000). I use VScore as my proxy 
for accounting fundamental because its components are commonly used in financial 
statement analysis and prior research suggests that forecasts future returns after 
controlling for other known stock predictors such as size and book to market (Choi and 
Sias 2012; Fama and French 2006). 
I calculate VScore at the end of quarter t-1 because I am interested in whether 
naked short sellers form their trades based on available accounting fundamentals. 
Following Piotroski (2000), each “good” signal contributes one point to the overall 
VScore while a “bad” signal does not contribute any points to the overall VScore. As a 
result, the VScore ranges from zero to nine points, with higher values representing firms 
with stronger fundamentals (Piotroski 2000). Specifically,  a firm is given one point for 
each instance of a positive return-on-assets (quarterly income before extraordinary items 
(IBQ) scaled by total assets at the end of the quarter (ATQ)), positive operating cash 
flow (OANCFY scaled by ATQ), an increase in return-on-assets, negative total accruals 
(the difference between IBQ and operating cash flow scaled by ATQ), a decrease in debt 
( DLCQ plus DLTTQ scaled by ATQ), an increase in the current ratio (current assets 
(ACTQ) divided by current liabilities (LCTQ)), not issuing equity during the quarter, an 
increase in gross margin (gross margin is defined as (SALEQ – COGSQ) divided by 
total sales (SALEQ)), and an increase in asset turnover(sales (SALEQ) divided by 
average ATQ). If naked short selling is price manipulation without a fundamental 
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underlying basis, the coefficient on VScore should be insignificant. However, to the 
extent that naked short selling is information-based, the coefficient on VScore will be 
negative and statistically significant because naked short sellers are likely to avoid value 
firms and focus on glamour firms instead.  
In addition to the composite measure of accounting fundamentals (VScore), I 
include firms’ capital expenditures (CapEx) in quarter t-1 and firms’ sales growth 
(SaleGrow) in quarter t-1. I define CapEx as the rolling sum of capital expenditures 
(CAPXY adjusted for each quarter) in the preceding four quarters divided by average 
total assets. SaleGrow is defined as the rolling sum of sales (SALEQ) for the preceding 
four quarters ending at fiscal quarter t-1 divided by the rolling sum of the preceding four 
quarters of sales ending in quarter t-5. Prior research suggests that high values of CapEx 
and SaleGrow are associated with firm growth and lower future returns (Beneish et al. 
2001; Lakonishok et al. 1994). To the extent that naked short selling is pure price 
manipulation without fundamental underlying basis, I expect the coefficients on CapEx 
and SaleGrow to be insignificant. However, if naked short sellers trade based on 
accounting fundamentals, I expect positive and significant coefficients on CapEx and 
SaleGrow.  
In addition to accounting fundamentals, I also control for additional firm 
characteristics that naked short sellers likely consider. The media and SEC assume that 
naked short selling is based on momentum. Accordingly, I include stock momentum 
(Momentum) to investigate whether naked short sellers trade on accounting 
fundamentals after controlling for stock momentum. I define Momentum as the buy-and-
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hold raw stock returns for the six-month period ending one month prior to the end of 
quarter t. Based on the SEC’s statements, I expect a negative coefficient on Momentum 
because naked short sellers likely avoid firms with high momentum and invest in firms 
with low stock price momentum. I also include dividend yield (DivYld) to control for 
the additional costs that naked short sellers face when purchasing stock in firms that pay 
dividends. I define DivYld as dividends paid per share (DVPSXQ) during quarter t-1 
divided by stock price (PRCCM) at the end of quarter t-1. Short sellers on the date of 
record are required to pay the dividend to the owner of the shares. Because the dividend 
increases the cost of holding short positions, I expect that naked short sellers are less 
likely to hold significant positions in firms with a high dividend yield. Accordingly, I 
expect a negative coefficient on DivYld. However, naked shorts have a shorter 
investment horizon than other investors (including covered short sellers) and are more 
likely to close out their position before the date of record. As a result, the dividend yield 
of a firm potentially may not influence whether a naked short seller will take a position 
in a given firm, which suggests that the coefficient on DivYld could be insignificant.  
I also include analyst forecast revisions (FREV) to control for market-related 
news and expectations about a firm’s future performance. I define FREV as the change 
in the analyst consensus earnings forecast for the preceding six-months divided by price 
at the end of month t-1. I expect a negative coefficient on FREV because Bernard and 
Thomas (1989) find that positive analyst forecast revisions are associated with positive 
future returns. I also control for firm size (Size) because anecdotal evidence suggests 
that short sellers are more likely to invest in smaller firms (Drummond 2006). I define 
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Size as the natural log of a firm’s total assets at the end of quarter t-1. Finally, I also 
include industry fixed effects and time fixed effects to control for any differences in 
trading across different industries and time periods. 
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4. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
4.1 Sample Selection 
Table 1 describes my sample selection process in detail. Consistent with prior 
research, I estimate naked short selling based on daily FTD data provided by the SEC 
(Devos et al. 2010; Fotak et al. 2009; Stone 2010) from Match, 2004 to October, 2008. I 
begin my sample in March, 2004 because it is the first moth that FTDs are available 
from the SEC. My sample concludes in October, 2008 because it is the month Rule 204 
(at the time called Temporary Rule 204T) became effective, which allows me to 
examine whether media and SEC assertions that naked short selling lack fundamental 
basis were warranted.12 To monitor naked short sales, the SEC compiles FTD data from 
stock exchanges on a daily basis and makes the data publicly available. To mitigate the 
likelihood that a FTD is unintentional, the SEC follows securities that have an aggregate 
FTD position that is greater than or equal to 10,000 shares for five consecutive days 
(SEC 2004).13  
After obtaining FTD data from the SEC, I limit my sample to the intersection of 
Compustat, CRSP, and I/B/E/S and eliminate firm-quarter observations that do not have 
the data necessary to estimate the regressions in my main analysis. In addition, I exclude  
                                                 
12 The time series analysis of naked short interest in Figure 1 suggests that naked short selling increased 
dramatically in 2008. To examine whether my results are driven primarily by naked short sales during the 
2008 financial crisis, I replicate my analysis using firm-quarters from 2004 to 2007. Inferences remain the 
same. 
13 In untabulated analysis, I require the aggregate FTD position for a firm to exceed 20,000 shares to 
further reduce the likelihood that an FTD is unintentional. Inferences remain the same. 
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financial institutions and other such regulated industries as public utilities, because they 
face different regulatory environments relative to the remaining Compustat population. I 
also eliminate observations with share codes (SHRCD from CRSP) other than 10 or 11 
to retain firms with ordinary common shares as well as observations with share prices 
less than $1.00. Finally, consistent with Edwards and Hanley (2010), I exclude IPO 
firms from my sample.14  My final sample consists of 2,687 firms and 30,027 firm-
quarters. 
 
 
TABLE 1.  
Sample Selection 
Selections 
 Number 
of Firms 
 Number of 
Observations 
Firm-quarters with data from 
Compustat/CRSP/IBES/SEC  
 
6,923 
 
126,079 
 
 
 
 
 Delete: Observations in the financial services 
industry and other regulated industries 
 
(1,928) 
 
(34,988) 
 
 
 
 
 Delete: Observations missing variables needed for 
analysis 
 
(1,954) 
 
(46,323) 
 
 
 
 
 Delete: Observations with stock prices lower or equal 
to $1.00 
 
(39) 
 
(824) 
 
 
 
 
 Delete: Observations later than October 2008  (315)  (13,917) 
     
Final quarterly sample  2,687  30,027 
 
 
                                                 
14 IPO firms are automatically excluded from this sample because SaleGrow requires quarterly sales data 
of past eight consecutive quarters. 
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of all variables used in my analysis.15 
The mean (median) of NakedShort is 0.00014 (0.00001), which suggests that naked 
short interest represents approximately 0.014 percent of a firm’s common shares 
outstanding.16 Since the mean of NakedShort is greater than its 75 percentile (0.00005), 
the distribution of NakedShort is skewed. The mean (median) of CoveredShort is 0.0609 
(0.0442), which is slightly higher than the total short interest levels reported in Drake et 
al. (2011). However, this level is consistent with the increasing trend of short interest in 
recent years.  
The mean of VScore is 0.0485 (median 0.050) over the sample period. The 
distribution of value score suggests that the sample firms are evenly distributed 
throughout the entire distribution and not concentrated on either end of the value 
spectrum. Mean CapEx is 0.0566, indicating that firms invest a modest portion of their 
total assets on new assets, while the mean of SaleGrow is 1.176, suggesting that most 
firms in this sample are growth firms. The mean (median) of DivYld is 0.002 (0.000), 
which indicates that, consistent with prior research (Blouin and Krull 2009; Liu and 
Kinney 2009), the majority of firms in my sample do not issue dividends. The mean 
(median) of one-quarter-ahead, characteristic-based benchmark returns17 is -0.00001  
 
                                                 
15 I winsorize (reset) all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
16 The mean (median) of NakedShort is lower than the mean (median) value reported in Boni (2006). 
However, this difference stems from a different sample composition as well as a different sample period. 
17 Characteristic-based benchmark return is the abnormal return after adjusting for a benchmark return 
based on firm size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum. The characteristic-based benchmark return is 
calculated based on Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) and Wermers (2004). The DGTW 
benchmarks are available via at http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables  Observations  Mean  Q3  Median  Q1 
NakedShortt  30,027  0.00014  0.00005  0.00001  0 
CoveredShortt  30,027  0.06090  0.08347  0.04424  0.01930 
VScoret-1  30,027  0.04853  0.06  0.05  0.04 
CapEx t-1  30,027  0.05664  0.06514  0.03484  0.01900 
SaleGrow t-1  30,027  1.17594  1.23744  1.11388  1.03278 
DivYld t-1  30,027  0.00153  0.00229  0  0 
FREVt  30,027  -0.00974  0.00346  -0.00059  -0.01086 
Momentumt  30,027  0.04916  0.19395  0.03378  -0.12500 
Sizet-1  30,027  6.60218  7.71274  6.54067  5.34744 
AbReturnt+1  30,027  -0.00001  0.10304  -0.00784  -0.11639 
____________________ 
NakedShortt is average daily naked short interest for the time period from five business days after a 
company files its 10K or 10Q to the end of the next quarter.  Naked short interest is calculated as the 
number of failed-to-deliver (FTD) shares deflated by shares outstanding (SHROUT).  FTD shares data 
are acquired from the SEC based on the Freedom of Information Act.   
CoveredShortt is average covered short interest for the time period from five business days after a 
company files its 10K or 10Q to the end of the next quarter.  It is estimated by subtracting naked short 
interest from total short interest.  Total short interest is the short interest ratio, calculated as short interest 
(SHORTINT) over common shares outstanding (SHROUT). 
VScoret-1 is F-Score based on Piotroski (2000) for fiscal quarter t-1 deflated by 100. F-Score is a 
composite measure of nine variables, with each variable converted to a 0 or 1: Return-on-Assets (ROA), 
Change in ROA, Operating Cash Flow (OANCFY) scaled by total assets (ATQ), Total Accrual scaled 
by ATQ, Change in Debt (DLCQ+DLTTQ scaled by ATQ), Change in Liquidity (Current Ratio), 
Equity Offer (a binary variable, equal to 1 if the firm does not issue new stocks during the quarter and 0 
otherwise), Change in Gross Margin Ratio, and Change in Asset Turnover Ratio.   
CapExt-1 is capital expenditures, calculated as the rolling sum of capital expenditures (CAPXY) for the 
preceding four quarters ending at fiscal quarter t-1 divided by average total assets.   
SaleGrowt-1 is sales growth, calculated as the rolling sum of sales (SALEQ) for the preceding four quarters 
ending at fiscal quarter t-1 divided by the rolling sum of sales for the preceding four quarters ending on 
quarter t-5.   
DivYldt-1 is dividend yield, equal to dividends per share (DVPSXQ) for quarter t-1, divided by stock price 
(PRCCM) at the end of quarter t-1.   
FREVt is forecast revision, calculated as the change in the analyst consensus earnings forecast for the 
preceding six-months divided by price at the end of month t-1.   
Momentumt is stock momentum, equal to the buy-and-hold raw stock return for the six-month period 
ending one month prior to the end of quarter t.   
Size is the natural log of (lagged) ATQ at the end of quarter t-1.   
AbReturnt+1 is characteristic-based, benchmark-adjusted, buy-and-hold returns for quarter t+1, calculated 
based on Daniel et al. (1997) and Warmers (2004).   
Year to-date variables, such as CAPXY, PRSTKCY, and OANCFY are adjusted to reflect information for 
the latest quarter. 
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(-0.00784). The remaining descriptive statistics of the remaining variables are similar to 
prior studies. 
Table 3 present univariate correlations for the sample with Pearosn (Spearman) 
correlations reported above (below) the diagonal. Consistent with both naked and 
covered short sellers targeting similar firms, I find a positive correlation between 
NakedShort and CoveredShort. Although the correlation between NakedShort and 
CoveredShort is significantly different from zero, it is also far less than one (i.e., perfect 
correlation) suggesting that naked short interest differs significantly from covered short 
interest. Consistent with naked short sellers trading based on accounting fundamentals, 
NakedShort is negatively (positively) correlated with VScore (CapEx and SaleGrow). 
Finally, I also find a negative correlation between NakedShort and Momentum, which is 
consistent with the SEC’s assumption that naked short sellers trade on momentum.  
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TABLE 3 
Pearson and Spearman Correlations 
 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
NakedShortt (1)  
 
 0.497  -0.124  0.069  0.102  -0.028  -0.072  -0.074  -0.165  -0.034 
CoveredShortt (2)  0.422  
 
 -0.080  0.113  0.110  -0.068  -0.039  -0.084  -0.087  -0.031 
VScoret-1 (3)  -0.066  -0.060  
 
 0.043  -0.014  0.080  0.192  0.197  0.254  0.019 
CapEx t-1 (4)  0.066  0.093  0.083  
 
 0.113  -0.051  0.017  0.022  0.056  0.006 
SaleGrow t-1 (5)  0.099  0.120  0.054  0.098  
 
 -0.123  0.071  0.058  -0.101  -0.007 
DivYld t-1 (6)  -0.077  -0.132  0.132  0.097  -0.147  
 
 0.030  -0.026  0.315  0.005 
FREVt (7)  -0.039  -0.081  0.242  -0.003  0.206  0.068  
 
 0.291  0.135  0.073 
Momentumt (8)  -0.045  -0.074  0.210  0.029  0.109  0.040  0.485  
 
 0.049  0.039 
Sizet-1 (9)  0.012  -0.021  0.252  0.159  -0.047  0.444  0.162  0.096  
 
 0.027 
AbReturnt+1 (10)  -0.030  -0.031  0.024  0.019  0.015  0.037  0.043  0.040  0.055   
____________________ 
Correlation coefficients in bold indicate two-tailed statistical significance levels of 5% or lower. Pearson correlations are reported in the upper triangle 
and Spearman in the lower triangle. The variables are described in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
30 
30 
5. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
5.1 Is Naked Short Interest Information-driven? 
Table 4 presents the results of equation (1), which examines the determinants of 
short interest. The first column of Table 4 presents results for determinants of naked 
short interest while the results for the determinants of covered short interest are reported 
in the second column. In both columns, I do not report the coefficients for industry and 
time fixed effects for the sake of brevity. All standard errors are clustered by firm 
(Petersen 2009).18   
The results in column (1) suggest that naked short interest is associated with 
accounting fundamentals. Specifically, the coefficient on VScore is negative and 
significant (t-statistic = 7.62), which suggests that naked short sellers are less likely to 
take positions in firms with strong accounting fundamentals. In addition, the coefficients 
on CapEx and SaleGrow are positive and significant (t-statistics = 3.78 and 5.94 
respectively), indicating that naked short sellers are aware of the implications of high 
levels of capital expenditures and sales growth (i.e., lower returns in the future) and 
increase their positions accordingly. Overall, the above results are consistent with naked 
short sellers trading based on accounting information, contrary to claims made by media 
and the SEC. 
The results in column (1) also verify the SEC’s assumption that naked short 
 
                                                 
18 I also conduct robustness tests by clustering on both time and firm (Gow et al. 2010), and using 
indicator variables to control for industry fixed effects. Results are similar. 
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TABLE 4 
The Effect of Accounting and Market Information on 
Naked Short Interest and Covered Short Interest 
 
Variables 
 
Predictions 
 (1)  (2) 
  StdNakedShortt 
(normalized) 
 StdCoveredShortt 
(normalized) 
Intercept  ?  0.21336‡  1.07953* 
 
   (4.90)  (1.94) 
VScoret-1  ?  -0.98506‡  -1.99939‡ 
 
   (7.62)  (4.55) 
CapExt-1  ?  0.40407‡  2.24568‡ 
 
   (3.78)  (6.65) 
SaleGrowt-1  ?  0.08416‡  0.33758‡ 
 
   (5.94)  (8.99) 
DivYldt-1  -  1.25281  -13.47815‡ 
 
   (1.06)  (2.72) 
FREVt  -  -0.11473*  -0.0177 
 
   (1.69)  (0.07) 
Momentumt  -  -0.02447†  -0.10148‡ 
 
   (2.29)  (3.46) 
Sizet-1  -  -0.02660‡  -0.02438† 
 
   (12.09)  (2.43) 
Industry Dummies    Yes  Yes 
Time Dummies    Yes  Yes 
Cluster on    Firm  Firm 
Observations    30,027  30,027 
Adj. R2    0.0753  0.0834 
____________________ 
*, †, and ‡ indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, with t-
statistic reported in parentheses. StdNakedShort and StdCoveredShort are normalized by dividing by their 
own standard deviations.  The remaining variables are described in Table 2.  
 
 
 
 
sellers trade on stock price momentum. The coefficient on Momentum is negative and 
significant (t-statistic = 2.29), which suggests that naked short sellers are more likely to 
take positions in firms with poor stock momentum. To examine whether naked short 
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sellers are more likely to base their trades on fundamental analysis or stock momentum, I 
compare the coefficients on VScore and Momentum. I find that the coefficient on 
VScore is significantly larger (i.e., more negative) than the coefficient on Momentum (F-
statistic = 6.52), suggesting that naked short sellers more likely trade on accounting 
fundamentals rather than purely on stock price momentum. Finally, I find negative and 
significant coefficients on Size and FREV (t-statistics = 12.09 and 1.69, respectively), 
suggesting that naked short sellers are less likely to take positions in larger firms as well 
as firms with increasing analyst expectations.  
To provide a complete examination of information usage by short sellers, I also 
examine whether covered short sellers trade on accounting fundamentals. The results of 
this analysis are presented in column (2) of Table 4 and suggest that covered short sellers 
trade on accounting fundamentals. Specifically, the coefficient on VScore is negative 
and significant (t-statistic = 4.55) while the coefficients on CapEx and SaleGrow are 
positive and significant (t-statistics = 6.65 and 8.99, respectively). Consistent with prior 
research (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993), the coefficient on Momentum is negative and 
significant (t-statistic = 3.46) suggesting that covered short sellers are more likely to take 
positions in firms that have negative price momentum. However, consistent with the 
results in column (1), I find that the coefficient on Momentum is significantly less 
prounounced (i.e., less negative) than the coefficient on VScore (F-statistic = 4.33). This 
result suggests that covered short sellers are more likely to take trading positions based 
on accounting fundamentals rather than stock price momentum. Finally, the coefficients 
on Size and DivYld are negative and significant (t-statistics = 2.43 and 2.72, 
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respectively), which suggests that covered short sellers are more likely to invest in 
smaller firms as well as firms that do not pay dividends. In sum, the results in column (2) 
confirm and extend findings of Drake et al. (2011) by showing that covered short interest 
is information driven. Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that both naked and covered 
short selling are associated with accounting and market fundamentals in a manner that is 
consistent with information-based trading. The finding that naked short sales are 
associated with accounting fundamentals contradicts the assumptions made by the media 
and SEC that naked shorts trade without a “fundamental underlying basis.” However, the 
results also highlight differences in the information usage of naked and covered short 
sellers. Specifically, naked shorts avoid taking positions in firms with increasing analyst 
expectations. In contrast, covered shorts are more likely to establish a position in a 
company that doesn’t pay a cash dividend.  
 
5.2 Predictive Power on Future Returns 
The results in Table 4 are consistent with both naked and covered short sellers 
trading based on accounting and market information. To provide an alternative test of 
whether naked short selling captures predictive information, I examine whether naked 
and covered short interest has predictive power for future abnormal returns. 
Accordingly, I estimate the following model:19  
 
 
                                                 
19 As a robustness test, I include VScore, CapEx, SaleGrow, FREV, MOMENTUM, and current quarter 
raw returns as control variables.Inferences remain the same. 
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AbReturni,t+1 = 0 + 1StdNakedShorti,t  2StdCoveredShorti,t + mIndustrym  
 nYear-Qtrn + i,t       (2) 
AbReturnt+1 is firm i’s one-quarter ahead characteristic-based abnormal return, 
calculated following Daniel et al. (1997) and Warmers (2004). To estimate equation (2), 
I restrict my sample to firms with positive naked short interest (i.e., I exclude firms with 
zero short interest). To the extent that naked short selling creates a crisis of confidence 
that destroys firm value, as suggested by the SEC (SEC 2009), future returns should be 
positive as the market corrects to the firm’s true value. Accordingly, I expect the 
coefficient on StdNakedShort will be positive. However, to the extent that naked short 
sellers trade based on accounting fundamentals that predict future poor performance, I 
expect the coefficient on StdNakedShort to be negative.  
Table 5 presents the results of my estimation of equation (2). In all columns, I do 
not report the coefficients for industry and time fixed effects for the sake of brevity. All 
standard errors are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009).20 Table 5, column (1) examines 
whether naked short interest is associated with future stock returns. The coefficient on 
StdNakedShort is negative and significant (t-statistic = 3.10), which is consistent with 
naked short sellers trading on accounting fundamentals that predict poor performance in 
the future. In column (2), I replace naked short interest with covered short interest. The 
coefficient on StdCoveredShort is negative and significant (t-statistic = 2.01), which is 
consistent with prior findings that high total short interest predicts lower returns 
                                                 
20 I also correct biased standard errors by clustering on both time and firm (Gow et al. 2010), and using 
indicator variables to control for industry fixed effects.  Inferences remain the same. 
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(Boehmer et al. 2010) and high total short interest levels combined with analysts’ buy 
recommendations predict lower returns in the future (Drake et al. 2011).  
 
 
TABLE 5 
Naked and Covered Short Interest and Future Abnormal Stock Returns 
 
Variables 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Predictions  AbReturnt+1  AbReturnt+1  AbReturnt+1 
Intercept  ?  0.0504  0.05298*  0.051 
 
   (1.62)  (1.73)  (1.62) 
StdNakedShortt 
(normalized) 
 ?  -0.006‡    -0.006‡ 
   (3.10)    (2.59) 
StdCoveredShortt 
(normalized) 
 ?    -0.003†  0 
     (2.01)  (0.14) 
Industry Dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cluster on    Firm  Firm  Firm 
Observations    19,801  19,801  19,801 
Adj. R2    0.0154  0.0147  0.0153 
____________________ 
*, †, and ‡ indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, with t-
statistic reported in parentheses. StdNakedShort and StdCoveredShort are normalized by dividing by their 
own standard deviations.  The remaining variables are described in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 5, column (3) examines whether naked short interest is associated with 
future abnormal returns after controlling for covered short interest. The shorter 
investment horizon of naked short sellers suggests that their positions are more likely to 
reflect recent information than the positions held by covered shorts. As a result, I expect 
that the coefficient on StdNakedShort will remain significant after controlling for 
covered short interest. Consistent with this expectation, the coefficient on 
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StdNakedShort remains negative and significant (t-statistic = 2.59) while the coefficient 
on StdCoveredShort is insignificant (t-statistic = 0.14). This result indicates that the 
predictive power of naked short interest on future abnormal returns dominates that of the 
covered short interest. Overall, results in Table 5 suggest that naked short selling is 
information-based and is in contrast to popular claims that naked short selling destroys 
firm values.  
 
5.3 Abnormal Future Returns Based on Sorted Short Interests 
Recent research suggests that investors can earn economically significant returns 
using a zero-investment trading strategy based on total short interest. For example, 
Boehmer et al. (2010) develop a strategy in which a potential investor buys (sells short) 
companies with extremely low (high) levels of total short interest (Boehmer et al. 2010). 
In addition, Drake et al. (2011) develop a zero-investment strategy where a potential 
investor buys (sells short) firms with sell (buy) analyst recommendations and with low 
(high) short interest. To examine whether the results in Table 5 translate to a profitable 
trading strategy, I develop a trading strategy based on the level of covered short interest 
as well as the level of naked short interest. To the extent this strategy yields profitable 
returns, it will provide evidence on the role naked short sellers play in the price 
discovery process. I first sort companies into quintile levels by the level of covered short 
interest. Within each quintile, I sort again into quintiles based on levels of naked short 
interest. I then investigate a zero-investment trading strategy in which a potential 
  
37 
37 
investor buys (sells short) firms with low (high) levels of both naked and covered short 
interest.  
The second column of Table 6 presents average abnormal returns after sorting on 
current quarter covered short interest only. The abnormal return of the lowest covered 
shorts quintile is a positive and insignificant 0.248 percent and the abnormal returns of 
the highest covered shorts quintile is a negative and significant 0.720 percent. Thus, an 
investor that buys (sells short) firms with covered short interest in the lowest (highest) 
quintile earns an average return of 0.968 percent each quarter. The results in this column 
suggest that a strategy based on covered short interest alone does not produce 
economically significant abnormal returns. 
The third through the seventh column report abnormal returns of each of the 25 
portfolios sorted by both covered and naked short interest. To examine the incremental 
predictive power of naked short interest, I examine the results of a trading strategy that 
purchases firms in the lowest quintile of both naked and covered short interest and sells 
short firms in the highest quintile of both naked and covered short interest. The results 
suggest that a trading strategy based on both naked and covered short interest earns an 
abnormal return of 3.76 percent per quarter, which is approximately 3.9 times greater 
than the return of less than one percent (0.968 percent) from a zero-investment strategy 
that uses only the covered component of short interest. The significant returns earned by 
the above trading strategy are consistent with naked short sellers being sophisticated 
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TABLE 6 
One-Quarter Ahead Abnormal Returns Based on Current Quarter Covered Short Interest Quintiles and  
Naked Short Interest Quintiles 
 
Covered 
Short 
Interest 
 Average 
Abnormal 
Returns 
 Naked Short Interest Level 
 
 Low  2  3  4  High  
Low – 
High 
Low  0.248%  0.885%*  0.814%  0.376%  -0.273%  -0.560%  1.444% 
 (3,958)  (789)  (793)  (793)  (793)  (790)   
2  0.335%  0.512%  1.189%†  0.483%  -0.137%  -0.372%  0.884% 
 (3,961)  (789)  (793)  (794)  (793)  (792)   
3  0.122%  1.135%*  0.560%  1.144%*  -0.622%  -1.608%†  2.743%† 
 (3,962)  (790)  (794)  (793)  (794)  (791)   
4  -0.063%  0.369%  0.753%  -0.286%  -0.573%  -0.576%  0.945% 
 (3,961)  (789)  (793)  (794)  (793)  (792)   
High  -0.720%†  -0.291%  -0.699%  -0.040%  0.315%  -2.873%‡  2.582%‡ 
 (3,959)  (789)  (793)  (794)  (789)  (794)   
               
Low - 
High 
 0.248% - 
(-0.720%) 
=0.968%†  
0.885% -  
(-2.873%)  
= 3.76%‡ 
____________________ 
†, and ‡ indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Number of observations is reported in parentheses and in italic. 
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users of accounting and market information and suggests that the level of naked short 
interest contains information about future returns. The results further suggest that SEC 
regulations that eliminate naked short selling likely harm the price discovery process.21  
In combination, the results in Tables 3 through 6 offer a potential explanation to 
Boehmer et al. (2010)’s finding that steady and reliable negative (positive) abnormal 
returns only exist in extremely high (low) total short interest levels.22  Stocks with 
extremely low total short interest levels are not likely to have naked short interest, which 
suggests that the stocks will earn positive abnormal returns in the future. In contrast, 
stocks with extremely high short interest levels are also likely to have high levels of 
naked short interest, which suggests that these stocks will produce negative abnormal 
returns in the future.  
 
5.4 Days a Firm Appears on the Threshold List 
SEC Rule 204 places significant restrictions on naked short sellers (SEC 2009). 
The SEC identifies abusive naked short selling based on the magnitude and duration of 
the FTD (SEC 2009). In terms of magnitude, the SEC argues that a firm is subject to 
intentional naked short selling if FTDs exceed 10,000 shares. In terms of duration, the  
                                                 
21 To validate the results in Table 6, I replicate my zero-investment trading strategy after sorting into 
quintiles first based on naked short interest and then based on covered short interest. Following a zero-
investment strategy that buys (sells shorts) firms with naked short interest in the lowest (highest) quintile 
earns an average return of 1.896 percent each quarter. A strategy based on both covered and naked short 
interest yields 2.571 percent each quarter. 
22 I replicate key results of Boehmer et al. (2010) using the monthly sample set that creates the main 
sample of this paper. I successfully replicate their hedge returns based on top and bottom one percent 
sorting on total short interest, but fail to reach their results based on top and bottom five and ten percent 
total short interest sorting. 
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SEC argues that FTDs that remain open for a long period of time reflect intentional short 
selling (SEC 2009). Consequently, Rule 204 requires short sellers to close out their 
position on the day following the end of the three day settlement period (i.e., day t+4). 
Equation (1) is based on the magnitude of an FTD and ignores the duration aspect of the 
SECs definition. In this section, I use days a firm appears on the threshold list as an 
alternative measure of naked short selling and test whether it indicates information 
usage. Specifically, I regress number of days a firm appears on the threshold list during a 
quarter (Onlistq) on accounting and market information based variables in equation (1) 
using a truncated negative binomial regression.  
Table 7 present results of this regression. Consistent with the results in Table 4, 
coefficients on accounting and market information-based variables such as VScore and 
Momentum (CapEx and SaleGrow) are negative (positive) and significant. In 
combination, these results reinforce my earlier findings and suggest that that naked short 
selling is information-based. 
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TABLE 7 
Does “Days a Firm Appears on the Threshold List” Represent Information? 
 
Variables  Predictions  Onlistqt (>10) 
Intercept  ?  2.307‡ 
 
   (5.34) 
VScoret-1  ?  -3.533‡ 
 
   (6.92) 
CapExt-1  ?  0.571† 
 
   (2.47) 
SaleGrowt-1  ?  0.077‡ 
 
   (3.02) 
DivYldt-1  ?  6.282 
 
   (1.37) 
Frevt  ?  -1.003‡ 
 
   (5.52) 
Momentumt  ?  -0.145‡ 
 
   (4.92) 
Sizet-1  ?  -0.111‡ 
 
   (11.76) 
Industry Dummies    Yes 
Time Dummies    Yes 
Cluster on    Firm 
Observations    9,157 
____________________ 
†, and ‡ indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively, with t-statistic 
reported in parentheses. OnlistQ is days a firm appears on the threshold list during current quarter t. The 
remaining variables are described in Table 2. 
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5.5 Robustness Tests 
StdNakedShort and StdCoveredShort are both calculated as the average short 
interest for the period from five business days after the last 10-K and 10-Q filing to the 
end of the current quarter. This definition assumes that short sellers cannot obtain any 
detailed accounting information before firms file their most up-to-date financial reports. 
Because it is possible that naked and covered short sellers could access financial 
information earlier, I construct two alternative specifications of naked and covered short 
interest to examine the robustness of my results. In the first alternative specification, I 
measure naked (covered) short interest as the average naked (covered) short interest over 
the last month of the current quarter. This definition assumes that the majority of firms 
finish filing their financial statements just before the last month of quarter t (except for 
some non-accelerated filers). Inferences remain the same. 
The second alternative specification measures naked (covered) short interest as 
the average naked (covered) short interest over the entirety of the current quarter. This 
specification assumes that investors use historical data to guide their trading decisions 
and update their strategies based on such information as management forecasts, analyst 
forecast and recommendation revisions, earnings announcements, and detailed financial 
reports after filing that emerge throughout the period. Inferences remain the same except 
that VScore is no longer associated with covered short interest. 
I also rank the original naked and short interest data by deciles and use decile 
ranks as the dependent variables. Inferences do not change except that both dividend 
yield and momentum are no longer significant in naked short interest regression. Finally, 
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I replicate the results in Table 5 after measuring future abnormal returns from quarter 
t+1 to quarter t+2. Inferences remain the same.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Popular media and corporate managers blame naked short selling for causing 
stock price declines and destroying values. Based on concerns that naked short selling 
manipulates prices without a fundamental underlying basis, the SEC issued rules to 
restrain and ban the naked short selling. This paper investigates whether naked short 
sellers trade based on accounting and market fundamentals.  
I use fail-to-deliver data made available by the SEC to decompose total short 
interest into naked and covered components. The most important finding of this paper is 
that naked short interest is significantly associated with accounting and market 
information based measures in the direction that are consistent with proper usage of 
information. Specifically, naked short interest is negatively associated with variables that 
predict positive future returns and positively associated with variables that predict lower 
future returns. I also find evidence that suggests that naked short selling is based more 
on fundamental analysis than on stock momentum, a result which is contrary to the SEC 
concerns. In addition, I find that naked short interest is negatively associated with future 
abnormal returns, which suggests that naked short sellers are able to identify firms with 
poor performance in advance of other market participants. I also develop a zero-
investment strategy that buys (sells short) shares with low (high) levels of both covered 
and naked short interest. I find that abnormal returns based on the investment strategy 
using both components of short interest are about 3.9 times larger than using only 
covered short interest, which suggests that naked short sellers aide in the price discovery 
process. Although I cannot rule out concerns that naked short sellers manipulate prices, 
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my combined results suggest that concerns that naked short selling lacks a fundamental 
underlying basis are unfounded.  
This study contributes to contemporary finance and accounting literatures in 
several ways. First, prior literature suggests that total short interest is significantly 
associated with market and accounting fundamentals in the direction consistent with 
proper usage of fundamentals to predict future returns (Drake et al. 2011). This study 
extends this finding to the naked and covered components of total short interest. We also 
show that the finding is robust to alternative measures of fundamentals. Second, we 
show that naked short selling provides information useful in predicting future returns. 
Separating total short interest into naked and covered components can increase profits 
from a zero-investment trading strategy that mimics trading by short sellers. Finally, the 
results in this study should be of considerable interest to regulators. While I do not 
attempt to refute the claim that naked short selling can be manipulative in some 
instances, I find consistent evidence across a wide range of tests showing that, on 
average, naked short selling is information based trading. This evidence is in stark 
contrast to the SEC’s stated assumptions about naked short selling and allows me to 
conclude that eliminating naked short selling is likely to impede arbitrage and thereby 
reduce market efficiency. 
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